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PROMOTING SMART AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH. THE EUROPEAN UNION INTERACTING WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION

Abstract

Over the past decades the competences of the European Union (EU) have been considerably increased. In the same period many important global issues have been entrusted to specialised international organisations (IOs). These two trends have produced a growing need for the EU to be well represented in the relevant IOs. The subject of this book is the rethinking of smart and inclusive growth. Among the international organisations, the OECD and the ILO are competent in these issues. The interrelations of the EU and these two IOs are complicated given the fact that the EU has not acquired a formal membership in either one. However, notwithstanding various institutional inadequacies, the EU has found ways to promote its objectives both on the global and European levels.

Keywords: international organisations, European Union, smart growth, OECD

1. Introduction

1.1. Objectives

This paper considers the role of the EU on the world scene. The subject is not new; it has been present since the conception of the EU. Indeed, Jean Monnet, the father of the European integration, has already indicated that European integration should not be the final perspective, but that the EU should aim at worldwide integration, promoting global organisations that foster fundamental values and create wealth for all¹.

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¹ “La Communauté que nous avons créée n’a pas sa fin en elle-même. ... elle n’est qu’une étape vers les formes d’organisation du monde de demain” (The Community that we have created is not a goal in itself... it is just one step towards the organization of the world of tomorrow) (Monnet 1976: 617).

The discussion in this paper is rooted in this vision. We want to establish how the EU can best pursue its main objectives in a rapidly integrating world setting. We focus thereby on the subjects of smart and inclusive growth, the theme of this book.

1.2. Structure

The paper is structured as follows.

First, we sketch the ways in which the integration process has developed both on the European and world level. We describe how over the past decades the competences of the European Union (EU) have considerably increased. In the same period, many important global problems have been entrusted to specialised international organisations (IOs). These two trends have produced a growing need for the EU to be well represented in the relevant IOs.

Next, we describe the way the relations between the EU and major international organisations have developed. First, we describe the point of view of the EU, which has adapted its constitution in order to claim its position in international fora, commensurate with its new competences. Then we describe the reluctance (or even opposition) of many international organisations to accept the EU among its members. It means that the EU has to work with inadequate institutional arrangements to play its role at the world level.

Finally, we focus on the subject of the book, which is rethinking of the issues of smart and inclusive growth. Among the international organisations, the OECD and the ILO are competent in these issues. We describe for each the kind of solution that has been elaborated for its relation with the EU and the way the EU has adapted to these institutional contexts to promote its objectives.

The paper will be round off with some general conclusions and suggestions for reorientation of research efforts.

2. The Historical Setting

2.1. European Union Development

The post war period has witnessed a very strong tendency towards European integration. Over the past half century, the EU has developed in two dimensions.

In terms of deepening, the EU has followed the stages of integration approach. It has developed from a Customs Union to an Economic and Monetary Union. In the course of its development it has gradually reinforced its institutions. Moreover, it uses an ever larger set of governance methods to effectively implement its policies. Finally, it has worked on consistency of its various policies via one integrated institutional setup.

In terms of widening, it has developed from a small group of western countries (the initial EC6) to almost complete sub-continental coverage. This enlargement has very significantly increased the differences in the level of economic development, political priorities, administrative practices, etc. This increased diversity makes it more difficult to come to uniform positions on a range of policies.

The picture of deepening/widening is not as simple as sketched above. First, not all Member States participate in all the activities (e.g. EMU, development aid, Schengen). Second, the EU uses different combinations of instruments for different policy areas; and for some policy areas, Member States are free to use their own set of instruments.

The EU system was severely shaken at several moments of its development; most recently with a deep economic and financial crisis. However, it has been able to overcome these by adapting its structures and governance methods. The EU has identified the major challenges it is confronted with and has defined its strategic objectives in the triad: smart, inclusive and sustainable growth, coupled with macro-economic stability and cohesion. This makes an integrated set of objectives with dedicated policies (Molle 2006, 2011, 2015).

Notwithstanding this elaborate governance architecture, it is not always easy for the EU to come to common policy choices; mainly due to the sheer size and diversity of its membership.

2.2. World Integration

In the past half century the world has seen a very strong increase in the interrelations between its constituent parts. This globalization process was fuelled by large benefits that could be drawn from international specialisation. It was made possible by the fact that a number of international organisations (IOs) did provide the institutional framework for facilitating such increased interrelations. One need but think of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which did promote trade liberalization and did provide a mechanism for dispute settlement.

Most of these organisations were created by western countries in the early postwar period. They started off with a limited mission and a limited coverage in terms of countries. In both respects, they have evolved.

As far as deepening is concerned, one sees that the process of global integration has not followed a stage approach (such as CU, CM and EMU). Neither has it used an integrated institutional setup. Indeed, organisations have been created and gradually adapted to respond to specific emerging challenges. The result is a real patchwork of specialised institutions. All have very idiosyncratic institutional structures and sets of governance methods to realise their specific sectoral objectives. Therefore, a wide diversity exists (Gstoehl 2008; Molle 2003, 2008, 2013; Sapir 2007).

As far as widening is concerned, one observes an ever larger participation of countries in the global integration process. The collapse of the communist rule caused the division into the “West”, the “Centrally planned” and the “Third world” to become irrelevant. Many countries opened their economies to the world and acknowledged the benefits of participating in the relevant IOs. Now virtually all countries in the world have acquired membership in major global institutions. Many have done so only reluctantly, as several of these IOs are dominated by the West and their ideology-based policy recipes are often inadequate for developing and emerging countries. In particular, the major BRICS are claiming stronger roles and make attempts to set up new organisations not dominated by the West.

This non-system suffers from two problems: lack of effectiveness and lack of consistency. There are serious doubts about the capacity of this non-system to face the challenges of the future, such as stability, equity, sustainability and growth (we leave security, religious conflicts etc. aside).

2.3. Implications

So we see a fairly divergent development of global organisations and of the European Union.

On the one hand, we see that global architecture consists of a set of partly overlapping specialised institutions. There is neither a common view of the challenges nor a common action plan to face them. Moreover, there is large uncertainty as to many factors, such as the motivations of major players, the consequences of increased interdependency of the private and public sectors (see: financial and debt crisis), the understanding of intricate economic interrelations (and hence of the impacts of shocks). To increase consistency, inter-institutional coordination frameworks are used, but these devices tend to have a limited effectiveness.

The EU system is much more strongly structured and has a stronger collective sense of purpose. However, there is much discontent with the apparent incapability

of the EU to effectively deal with major problems such as instability, unemployment and threats to security. There are large differences in opinion as to the best ways to tackle such problems and to deal with the uncertainties that are the consequence of the increased openness to influences of the rest of the globe.

As the EU is now competent to deal with a series of policy issues, there is a growing need for the EU to act in the relevant IOs to promote the delivery of global public goods in such a way that they respect the interests of the EU. However, due to the very different development paths of the EU and the world organisations, the role of the EU in global matters is under strain.

3. The European Union in IOs: General

3.1. The European Union Viewpoint

The EU is a regional organisation and it has promoted regionalism in the rest of the world. However, it is very much aware of the fact that most regional organisations are very weak and cannot form the basis for world governance. All these regional organisations have a very limited scope in terms of competences; they are limited to free trade arrangements and a timid form of monetary coordination. Therefore, the EU is a supporter of “effective multilateralism”² and is committed to a world order based on rules instead of power³. Seen from the viewpoint of the EU, its role in the IOs (that institutionalise multilateralism) has changed in two respects.

The first is of a political-economic nature. Individual Member States no longer have sufficient weight to make a real difference on the global scene. Operating as one provides the EU with the total weight of its constituent parts in the frameworks of international organisations. And the EU can achieve much better results in international negotiations than individual Member States would⁴. However, in practice

² See for the definition of the term: Montobbio (2013) and for the application on a number of policy areas: Drieskens and van Schaik (2014). See also Costa (2013) and Kissack (2010).

³ See: Wessel and Blockmans (2014). Mind that rules need not always be formal rules, but increasingly take one of the many forms of informal soft law (Pauwelyn et al 2012). The EU has often taken the lead in the process of adopting such formal and informal international rules. Cases in point are the climate package and the fundamental labour standards (that the International Labour Organisation develops in the framework of its “Decent Work” agenda).

⁴ See for the problem and possible solutions: Sapir (2007) and Emerson et al. (2011). See Van Schaik (2013) and Da Conceicao-Heldt & Meunier (2015) for more nuanced opinions as to the power of a unified position of the EU.

this is less clear than in principle. In many areas, competences are actually shared between the EU and its Member States. In such cases complicated arrangements have been made to define the role of both the EU and its Member States in global instances⁵.

The second is of a legal nature. Since the origin of the EU, the basic treaties have stipulated as a principle that as soon as a competence is handed over from the national governments to the EU instances, the external dimension of that policy becomes a matter of the EU as well. In order to allow the EU to play its role well on the international scene, its “constitution” has been adjusted at several occasions. The Lisbon Treaty complemented this process in four ways. First, it gave international legal personality to the EU. Second, it defined the main objectives and norms that have to guide the actions of the EU instances on the international scene⁶. Third, it clearly defined the roles of the major actors, in particular of the Commission and of the Presidency of the Council⁷. Finally, it established the European External Action Service. These changes allow the EU to be more effective in its external relations.

3.2. IOs Viewpoint

The foundations of the major institutions with a global vocation, such as IMF, WB, OECD and ILO have been laid down in international treaties between sovereign states. These treaties do only recognize states as members, which is understandable as supra-state entities such as the EU did not yet exist when these IOs were created. Global organisations that have been created later did take the EU into account. An example is the WTO, which has acknowledged the specific competence of the EU in trade matters and has accepted the EU as a full member (next to the EU Member States). Other organizations and regimes that emerged later could also take the competences

⁵ Over a wide range of issues that fall into the realm of international organisations (for instance the conclusion of a new global climate agreement) the countries of the EU have to coordinate their positions in order to get the best result out of international negotiations. See e.g. European Commission (2004).

⁶ “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations” (TEU, Article 21).

⁷ In all areas of EU external policy (Article 218 TFEU) where the EU wants to enter into arrangements with international organisations, the Commission has to do the negotiations and the Council (and EP) takes the decisions. Under EMU, the pattern is complicated, because the role of external representative is attributed to the Council and part of the competences are in the realm of the ECB. (Emerson, Kaczynski 2010).

of the EU into account (albeit sometimes with complicated institutional compromises, like the G20)⁸.

For the older IOs there is a strong tension between the old form and the new reality. There are two reasons why a solution to this friction is difficult to find. One is specific to the IO in question; the other is internal to the EU.

Many non-EU members of the major international organizations resist a change of the articles that would permit supranational organizations such as the EU to be accepted as members alongside sovereign states. There are several reasons for this position. Power politics is one inhibiting factor: the West dominates several of the major global economic institutions. Thus, any decision to extend the weight of the West by accepting the EU alongside its members meets with strong resistance of non-western countries. In several cases (for instance the IMF), the EU and its Member States expressed their willingness to accept a limitation to their power. However, they made this dependent on a simultaneous decrease in votes of the US and on improvements in the governance model of the organisation in question. As this would imply the loss of the de facto veto power by the US, the latter did not accept it. Asian countries have now lost patience and under the leadership of China are in the process of constructing alternatives to the WB/IMF setup.

It might have been possible to overcome these problems had the European Union taken a strong and unequivocal position to substitute itself for its Member States. However, this was not the case. One reason is the diversity of legal situations; for instance, some EU countries are not members of the euro zone, so their external monetary policy is not handed over to the EU. Moreover, there is a tendency among many Member States to stay involved in external actions even in instances where the EU has the competences (e.g. in the WTO). Finally, there is politics; Member States which do not want the EU to develop in certain areas (such as EMU) do not facilitate the participation of the EU in the international organisations dealing with that matter.

3.3. Implications

The tensions depicted above create a major challenge: to improve the effectiveness of the major organisations at the world level while offering a role to the EU that is commensurate with its constitutional competences and its political power [See for instance Costa and Jorgensen (2012) and Wessel, Blockmans (2013, 2014)]. The way

⁸ Examples are the Kyoto protocol, the Bank of International Settlements, the Financial Stability Board and the G20 (Molle 2013).

this challenge can best be faced has been the subject of much academic and political debate⁹.

Once created IOs are difficult to change¹⁰. It implies that the EU is unlikely to be able to acquire a stronger and more formal position in most IOs. Thus, it has to make the best of the present situation. In order to promote its interests on the global scene, the EU has to evaluate the institutional settings in which this can best be done. It will choose the venue that seems to be most likely to lead to results. This need not be an existing IO; indeed the latter have on many occasions been bypassed and new and experimental structures were created (Princen 2010).

Let us see how the situation presents itself for the two topics of the present book: smart and inclusive growth. Among all the IOs the OECD is the only one competent in the first issue: innovation and growth (alongside many other policy issues). In many respects, the ILO is the IO competent in inclusive growth. We will devote a separate section to each, taking the institutional approach rather than the issue approach.

4. The EU–OECD Relation

4.1. The OECD Structure¹¹

The objectives of the OECD are of a very general nature: the promotion of policies that will improve the economic and social wellbeing of people around the world. The OECD provides a forum in which the governments of member countries can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems. To that end the OECD establishes data bases and makes analyses on a broad range of subjects, such as productivity (and innovation), employment, financial stability, environment, macroeconomic balance, taxation, etc.

⁹ Studies of the EU in major IOs have been made notably by political scientists, see: Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2011) and Oberthur et al (2013), Jorgensen (2009), Jorgensen and Costa (2013), Jorgensen et al (2011) and Jorgensen and Laatikainen (2013). For a legal point of view see Wessel (2011) and Van Voorn et al (2013).

¹⁰ To avoid ill-adapted institutions, one has moved away from formal institutions and adopted more flexible and informal forms, such as a customer-based light organisation (e.g. the Internet), informal gatherings of government leaders (e.g. the G20) or cooperation in networks of both public and private actors (e.g. in the environment) (Molle 2013).

¹¹ For further information on the development of the OECD, see: Carroll, Kellow (2011, 2013), Mahon, MacBride (2009); Woodward (2009); Martens, Jacobi (2010); Clifton, Diaz Funtés (2011).

To realise its objectives, the OECD uses a limited set of governance methods. The main one is coordination. The actual coordination work is done in some 250 working groups and specialised committees; formed of experts coming from the administrations of the member countries (and the EU Commission). The OECD staff does in-depth comparative studies that may result in specific recommendations for the member countries.

The OECD has a membership that is limited to the most developed countries in the world. The organisation is funded by its member countries; national contributions are based on a formula which takes account of the size of each member's economy. Countries may also make voluntary contributions to financially support specific OECD programmes.

Innovation (smart growth) has always been at the centre of the concerns of the OECD. Mind that the OECD is the only IO that assumes a role in this matter. Innovation is one of the main drivers of growth and the OECD has done many studies into the way countries could promote innovativeness. Moreover, it makes country-specific reviews of innovation policy.

The issue of inclusiveness also falls under the mission of the OECD, and OECD action appears in different guises¹². In employment matters, one of the main activities of the OECD is the annual Employment Outlook. In matters of social protection and welfare, the OECD pursues its aims mainly in the framework of its Economic Surveys.

4.2. The European Union Position

The EU–OECD relation is very important. First in terms of membership; most EU countries are also OECD members, while the EU constitutes a large part of the OECD membership. Next, in terms of subjects: the OECD covers all the socio-economic policy areas the EU covers too. Finally, in terms of governance instruments; the OECD is well known for its specific way of operation: study, exchange of views and experiences, benchmarking, codes (Mahon, McBride 2009; Woodward 2009; Carroll, Kellow 2011; Clifton, Diaz Fuentes 2011)¹³; these instruments are also widely used by the EU.

These factors combined with those discussed in section 3 have resulted in a special position of the EU in the OECD. Although the EU as such has not become a member,

¹² Inclusiveness is an elusive notion, so one could consider that more aspects of the OECD work, such as pensions and education, fall also in this category. However, we will not go that far. See in this respect for instance Papadopoulos (2011); Martens et al (2004). Inclusiveness can also be promoted by specific innovations (OECD 2015).

¹³ For a comparison of these methods between the EU and the OECD, see e.g. Groenendijk (2009).

an agreement between the two organisations permits the European Union to be involved in the daily work of the OECD. Civil servants of the European Commission participate fully in OECD committees and working groups; some even chair the more influential ones. Moreover, the Commission finances a number of programmes of the OECD in which it is particularly interested. These are mostly motivated by the wish to confront the internal EU work on a controversial subject with the ideas and practices in other OECD countries in order to facilitate internal decision making and external consistency of EU rules and policies.

4.3. Effectiveness in Reaching Objectives

The influence of the OECD on its members has been very significant (Armingeon 2004: 236; Woodward 2009). Examples of such effectiveness are given in Box 1.

However, this influence is not unidirectional; the EU and its members have strongly promoted the work of the OECD and have actively participated in the elaboration of policy ideas, principles and good practices. On the one hand, the EU has “downloaded” many elements of its policy from the OECD’s work; on the other hand, it has also been able to “upload” elements to the OECD level.

Examples of “downloading” the OECD’s ideas and policy recipes can be found in the innovation policy. The OECD has established a long-term record in developing new ideas and checking their applicability in specific policy contexts. The OECD’s work in the matter has actually influenced the recast of the EU Lisbon strategy and a number of national strategies following the OECD’s reviews of their innovation policy¹⁴.

Box 1. OECD. Generating New Ideas and Promoting their Implementation

The OECD has been leading in matters of sustainability policy; already in the 1970 it developed the major principles (such as polluter pays) that have been adopted by all members and now guide both the global and the EU environmental policy. Another example of leadership in policy renewal is the OECD’s concern with the quality of government. In this respect a strong interaction has developed between the OECD and the EU in three domains. First, the OECD has developed a coordination method (with reviews, guidelines and recommendations as main elements) that has very strongly influenced the definition of the Open Method of Coordination by the EU and its adoption in a number of EU policy areas (Groenendijk 2010; Schaefer 2006; Martens et al 2004; Martens, Jacobi 2010; Molle 2011). The same can be said concerning the quality of regulation; the EU Smart Regulation programme is very heavily indebted to the work of the OECD on better regulation, among others by Regulatory Impact Analysis (de Francesco 2013)⁹. Finally, we mention the fight against corruption: the OECD’s work in the matter is closely linked to that of the EU (Wolf 2010).

⁹ Note: Mind that the EU has actually financed the OECD to promote the concept of better regulation in its member countries, considering the OECD mechanisms more effective than its own. The same is true for the SIGMA programme: “Support for Improvement in Governance and Management”, in which the EU finances work in the EU Member States, the candidate countries and the neighbouring countries.

Source: OECD (2011).

¹⁴ See for the policy: OECD (2010) and for the OECD suggestion on Lisbon: Padoan (2009).

An example of “uploading” is smart specialization. This concept was initially developed in the framework of an EU working group that considered many investments in innovation policy to be insufficiently productive because of their general character and lack of “embeddedness” in the regional economy, so regions have to specialize on specific technological trajectories related to their structure and potential. These principles have become a central element in the new EU cohesion policy. They have been extensively discussed among EU and OECD experts and are promoted now by the OECD to its membership as best practice, both on the regional and national level¹⁵.

The EU–OECD relation in the matters of inclusive growth is also characterised by an exchange of policy ideas and practices, where both examples of “uploading” and “downloading” can be found¹⁶.

5. The European Union – the International Labour Organization Relation

5.1. The International Labour Organization Structure

The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the main organisation dealing with labour-related and inclusiveness issues at the world level. The ILO is an exception in the world of international organisations because it is tri-partite: governments, trade unions and employer associations.

Its main instrument is regulation: it sets international standards (conventions) on many aspects of labour markets, industrial relations and social issues. Member countries are free to adopt ILO conventions and can even withdraw from a convention they had previously accepted. But once a member country has ratified a convention, its government is legally obliged to implement it correctly. The ILO supervises the compliance of its members by an involved procedure in which governments regularly send reports to the ILO. Representatives of employers’ and workers’ organisations

¹⁵ For a specific description of the smart specialisation approach, see: Foray (2015) and Mac Cann (2015), for the EU cohesion policy in general: Molle (2015) and for the application of the ideas in other OECD countries: OECD (2013).

¹⁶ See in this respect: Dostal (2004), Armingeon (2004), Noaksson, Jacobson (2003) and Kildal (2009). An interesting example is the recent cooperation of the EU and the OECD in an EU-financed OECD programme for inclusive entrepreneurship; this programme (OECD 2014) aims at vulnerable groups (such as ethnic minorities, young people) and tries to find new ways of activation, among others by adapting the relation between work and welfare systems.

comment on these reports. The other ILO instrument is technical assistance to countries that struggle with labour law issues.

5.2. The European Union Position

The position of the EU in the ILO is a complicated one. The articles of the ILO limit membership to states. Given the competences of the EU in labour and social matters, a special status would be justified. However, even that has not been accepted by the majority of members, so other solutions had to be found for solving the numerous problems that arise because the objectives and competences of the EU and the ILO overlap and hence are (potentially) conflicting.

Four mechanisms have been put in place. The first is coordination of EU Member States on ILO issues. The second is the representation of the EU's view in the ILO discussions by the EU member that holds the Presidency of the EU Council. The third is the (non-voting) observer status for the EU in certain instances of the ILO. The last is the creation of a coordination platform between the ILO secretariat and the European Commission. For quite some time these arrangements have not been able to provide a fruitful relation between the two organisations and many conflicts arose. A decade ago, the two organisations decided to make the best of the existing situation and to define a number of common objectives for enhanced cooperation (ILO 2012).

5.3. Effectiveness in Reaching Objectives

The first objective of the cooperation is to avoid conflicts over the interpretation of the ILO rules in the context of the EU's legal system. Reaching this objective is still difficult, due to the limitations of the internal coordination of the EU while negotiating ILO texts; the differences in implementation mechanisms and the specific role of the judiciary in the EU¹⁷.

The second objective is to cooperate effectively in the promotion of labour protection around the world (in ILO terms "decent work"). There is both a moral and an economic rationale for pursuing this objective. The first one is self-evident. The latter may require some explanation. Labour protection helps the investment in human capital and thereby promotes productivity and hence development. Moreover, promoting labour standards at the global level means the limitation of the competition coming from producers that benefit from low-paid and poorly protected labour

¹⁷ For efforts to minimise conflicts, see ILO (2006), for implementation Harlapp (2007) and for examples of still remaining conflicts Seifert (2013).

(popularly called social dumping). So, the EU has an interest in striving for stricter norms on the global level. There is a dilemma in this respect. Indeed, the more the EU pushes its agenda for setting high standards, the lower the number of countries that ratify the text and the more numerous the cases of non-compliance with ratified texts (van Aart 2011; Kissack 2011).

In order to mitigate this effect the EU has put in place a financial instrument. It finances extra-budgetary ILO programmes of technical assistance to promote, for instance, decent work in developing countries (ILO 2009, 2012). Moreover, the EU finances preparatory work of the ILO in sensitive areas where the ILO membership does not provide the necessary budgetary support (for instance in the maritime sector).

The conclusion of the previous considerations is that the EU has found a way of pursuing its objectives in the ILO notwithstanding the very clumsy institutional arrangements on which the cooperation between the two organisations is based.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The objective of this paper was to see to what extent the EU's action in international organisations is effective. We selected in this respect the OECD and the ILO, as they are competent in smart and inclusive growth. The interrelations of the EU and these two IOs are complicated, given the fact that the EU has not acquired a formal membership in either one. However in practice, the EU has found ways to interact with these IOs and to promote its objectives both at the global and European levels.

The theme of this book is the re-thinking of EU education and research for smart and inclusive growth. The present paper has not dealt with the education side, only with the research side. On this latter score our investigation has shown that there is a domain where much further research is warranted: the interaction between the EU and the OECD is indeed a largely under-researched area¹⁸, so we recommend scientists to (re-)orient their research work towards one of the policy domains where the EU and

¹⁸ This is put in the limelight by the following citations:

“The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development is a much cited, but little studied institution, and its role in international governance is poorly understood”(Mahon, McBride 2009).

“OECD,... being one of the least researched institutions”(Jorgensen, Laatikainen 2013: 7) .

“Even today, it remains something of a paradox that an organisation comprising major economies which, despite the rise of Asia and other regions, still overshadow the rest of the world as regards trade, investment and GDP, has not received as much attention from scholars in the fields of international relations, political science and economics” (Clifton, Diaz Fuentes 2011: 297)

the OECD both pursue objectives. Indeed, it is important to establish under which conditions such interaction is most effective.

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